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Abstract
Scenarios of global greenhouse gas emissions have played a key role in climate change analysis
for over twenty years. Currently, several research communities are organizing to undertake a
new round of scenario development in the lead-up to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To help inform this process, we assess a
number of past efforts to develop and learn from sets of global greenhouse gas emissions
scenarios. We conclude that while emissions scenario exercises have likely had substantial
benefits for participating modeling teams and produced insights from individual models,
learning from the exercises taken as a whole has been more limited. Model comparison
exercises have typically focused on the production of large numbers of scenarios while
investing little in assessing the results or the production process, perhaps on the assumption that
later assessment efforts could play this role. However, much of this assessment potential
remains untapped. Efforts such as scenario-related chapters of IPCC reports have been most
informative when they have gone to extra lengths to carry out more specific comparison
exercises, but in general these assessments do not have the remit or resources to carry out the
kind of detailed analysis of scenario results necessary for drawing the most useful conclusions.
We recommend that scenario comparison exercises build-in time and resources for assessing
scenario results in more detail at the time when they are produced, that these exercises focus on
more specific questions to improve the prospects for learning, and that additional scenario
assessments are carried out separately from production exercises. We also discuss the obstacles
to better assessment that might exist, and how they might be overcome. Finally, we recommend
that future work include much greater emphasis on understanding how scenarios are actually
used, as a guide to improving scenario production.
Keywords: scenarios, climate change, integrated assessment, learning
1. Introduction
Scenario development has a long history of use both in and
outside of the climate change field. Scenarios can serve a
variety of purposes. One key dimension of this variety is
the extent to which scenario exercises serve either process-
or product-oriented purposes (Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008,
Hulme and Dessai 2008b, O’Neill et al 2008). For some
exercises, the process of scenario development is itself the
primary goal, for example as a means to find commonalities
across different perspectives, achieve consensus on goals, or
come to a shared understanding of challenges. Scenarios
developed in the business community to promote strategic
thinking have frequently been process-oriented. For others,
the product—the content of the scenarios developed—is the
main goal. Once produced, these products then have a life
of their own that is generally divorced from the process
that generated them, serving many further purposes. Global
emissions scenarios, and in particular those that are the focus of
this paper, are regarded as mainly product-oriented exercises.
What is of most interest are the emissions pathways that are
produced, how they relate to the various factors driving them,
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and what the results tell us about the prospects for future
climate change, impacts, and mitigation.
Over the past decade there have been methodological
developments in scenario production that have begun to merge
approaches from the two different traditions. The integrated
scenario communities have begun to combine the primarily
interpretative and narrative-based scenario analyses undertaken
by Royal Dutch/Shell (Wack 1985a, 1985b, Schwartz 1991)
and other groups, which were mainly process-oriented,
with primarily product-oriented analytical and quantitative
integrated modeling work. The result has been new sets
of scenarios that, while still clearly falling in the product-
oriented category, draw on approaches from both camps by
combining the development of detailed narrative storylines
with their ‘quantification’ in various integrated models (Raskin
et al 1998, Nakicenovic et al 2000). For example, the Special
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al
2000) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) represented one such early effort to include a process
for scenario development that started with storylines that were
translated into four sets of quantitative scenarios. The process
was highly iterative in its attempt to combine interpretive
storylines with descriptive modeling, differing sharply from
previous IPCC scenario development exercises (Houghton et al
1990, Leggett et al 1992).
A number of subsequent scenario development efforts
have expanded on and improved this approach. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment scenarios (Carpenter et al
2005) also cut across the narrative and quantitative divide in
their four scenario sets. The US Climate Change Science
Program (CCSP) scenarios (Clarke et al 2007, Parson et al
2007) included both components as well, although not in an
integrated form: one volume contained a detailed assessment
of scenario development processes, including the role of
interpretative dimensions, while the other described an exercise
to develop more traditional quantitative scenarios by three
integrated assessment modeling groups. The integration of
process and content still remains as one of the major challenges
to be overcome in the further development of emissions
scenarios.
Little attention has been devoted to understanding the
use, value, or success of scenarios. Hulme and Dessai
(2008a, 2008b) propose that success might be judged in terms
of the predictive value, contribution to decision-making, or
facilitation of learning resulting from scenarios, and illustrate
this possibility using as an example the scenarios developed as
part of the UK Climate Impacts Program. Here we address the
last of their three criteria for judging success—the facilitation
of learning—by evaluating how much we have learned from a
number of prominent global emissions scenario exercises. In
contrast to Hulme and Dessai (2008a), our main focus is not
the learning among participants in the scenario development
processes that may have taken place (although we agree that
this is one useful outcome). Rather, we focus on learning
from evaluating the products: the scenarios produced. We
measure this learning by identifying and evaluating the lessons
that have been reported in published assessments of scenarios.
We include assessments of the broad scenario literature such
as those found in IPCC reports, as well as assessments of
scenarios that were produced as a set, often as part of model
comparison exercises. Thus our goal is not to offer a new
assessment of the primary scenario literature, drawing our own
conclusions about what we can learn from scenarios so far
developed. Rather, we assess existing assessments, in order to
identify what learning can be documented to have taken place
already from evaluating sets of scenarios as a group.
Better understanding what we have learned from
scenarios, and what factors may have helped or hindered
such learning, can be useful in maximizing learning from
future exercises. This is particularly important given that
the scenario communities—including climate and earth system
modeling, integrated assessment, and impacts, adaptation
and vulnerability communities—are about to embark on a
new round of scenario development in advance of a Fifth
Assessment Report by IPCC, expected to be published in
2013–2014. This new scenario development has been
catalyzed by a series of IPCC expert meetings, and a basic
framework outlining the process has been established (Moss
et al 2008). However many details remain to be worked out
by the research communities themselves. The remainder of
the paper evaluates a number of past scenario development
and assessment exercises, identifying conclusions drawn and
strengths or weaknesses of the process from the point of
view of learning. We then summarize findings and use them
to make several recommendations for how future scenario
processes might be designed to maximize the potential for
learning, including a focus on more specific questions and
greater investment in assessing results.
2. Emissions scenarios: assessing the assessments
We briefly examine six assessments or scenario exercises
that included some element of assessment of its own results:
the SRES, the post-SRES mitigation scenarios developed for
the IPCC Third Assessment Report (Morita and Robinson
2001), two model comparisons from the Energy Modeling
Forum (Weyant 2004a, de la Chesnaye and Weyant 2006),
the chapter on mitigation scenarios included in the IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report (Fisher et al 2007), and the
scenarios developed for the US Climate Change Science
Program (CCSP; Clarke et al 2007). This survey is not
comprehensive. In particular, it does not focus on a few
recent comparison exercises that would likely offer additional
insights into learning from assessments, including the Low
Carbon Society scenarios (Skea and Nishioka 2008, Strachan
et al 2008) and the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project
(Grubb et al 2006). Nonetheless, we believe our empirical
basis is wide enough to draw an initial set of conclusions.
2.1. SRES (2000)
The SRES scenarios were produced in order to provide the
climate change research communities with a common basis
for climate change projections, mitigation analyses, and impact
assessments. Given that goal, and the nature of the IPCC as an
assessment body rather than a generator of new research, the
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remit to the writing and modeling teams was to produce a set
of scenarios that spanned the range found in the literature, for
driving forces as well as emissions. The scenarios were also
limited to describing possible futures in which no additional
climate change policies were assumed to be adopted. The
approach combined four broad narrative storylines with six
different models, leading to a total of 40 quantitative scenarios.
Most of the SRES report is devoted to review of the
scenario literature and an extensive description of the process
of development of the SRES scenarios, and of the scenario
outcomes themselves. Deriving lessons from the scenarios was
a task largely left to intended users. Nonetheless, some initial
descriptive conclusions were drawn in the report itself. Most of
these describe individual aspects of driving force and emissions
results, but there are three that derive from an assessment of
the set of scenarios taken as a whole (see e.g. the SPM and
Technical Summary, Box TS-4):
• there is no single central ‘best guess’ scenario either in the
existing literature or in the SRES scenarios;
• technology is at least as important a driving force of
GHG emissions as population and economic development
across the set of 40 SRES scenarios; and
• scenarios with different driving forces can lead to similar
cumulative emissions and those with similar driving forces
can branch out into different categories of cumulative
emissions.
The first conclusion strengthened a message from the
previous set of IPCC scenarios, the IS92 scenarios. Although
the IS92 scenarios were presented as a set of six alternative
pathways with no single most likely outcome, most users
adopted the central IS92a scenario as the ‘business as usual’
scenario and used it alone. The SRES report went to
substantial further lengths to avoid this outcome, associating
alternative storylines with each scenario family and providing
no emissions path which appeared to be central. The judgment
of the SRES authors was that, while some users might believe
that one scenario or family was more likely than another,
another user might have a differing but valid opinion. The
authors therefore described the scenarios as equally sound but
offered no judgment of their own as to relative likelihood.
The second conclusion was derived from a kind of
model comparison exercise carried out within the overall
SRES framework, addressing the question of how sensitive
future emissions might be to alternative assumptions about
technological development. A set of variants of one scenario
family (the A1) was created that reflected different assumptions
about whether the direction of technological change in the
energy sector was toward or away from fossil fuel-intensive
technologies. It showed that this assumption, holding other
drivers such as population and economic growth the same,
can lead to a range of emissions that is as large as the range
across the full set of SRES outcomes. The third conclusion
generalizes this result, and also shows the converse: that
similar emissions can result from different combinations of
driving forces. Among other things, this conclusion had
important implications for impact assessments by pointing to
the necessity of considering a wide range of possible socio-
economic conditions that could be consistent with a given
climate change outcome.
The SRES report therefore did include useful general
conclusions drawn from analysis of the scenario set as a
whole. However the scope for drawing such conclusions was
limited by the fact that the main task of the process was
assessment of the scenarios in the literature and production of
a set of scenarios that reflected that literature. This restricted
scope limited potential contributions in two important areas.
First, there was scant opportunity for assessment of the
SRES scenarios themselves. Instead, this task was left to
future research, which would presumably draw on the SRES
scenarios, and to future assessment activities. Second, the
scenarios did not aim to address specific research questions.
For example, the climate change implications of the scenarios
were not addressed, nor were questions about the highest or
lowest plausible emissions scenarios in the absence of climate
policy. Thus, even though users often assume that the SRES
range can be taken to represent the full range of uncertainty in
plausible emissions futures (and, by extension, in the climate
change outcomes based on SRES that were later produced),
that assumption is true only if one assumes that the underlying
literature that SRES reflects already fully captured that range,
an assumption that has not been examined. Similarly, the
sensitivity analysis to technology assumptions was a useful
exercise directed at a more specific question, but was not
replicated for other driving forces. For example, no analysis
of sensitivity to a full uncertainty range in population or
economic growth assumptions was carried out. This was likely
beyond the time and resources available to the SRES team, but
nonetheless represents a lost opportunity for a fuller analysis.
2.2. IPCC Third Assessment Report—the post-SRES scenarios
(2001)
The most substantial effort to draw conclusions from the body
of emissions scenario literature occurs in the periodic IPCC
assessments. However, given the fact that the IPCC cannot do
new analysis, possibilities are limited. IPCC chapters assessing
emissions scenarios describe the general features of scenarios
as a group, and identify broad trends. It is rarely possible
to evaluate individual scenarios; at best, a few outliers may
be mentioned. A detailed analysis of both the process and
content of different scenarios in the literature is not possible
both because of the size of the task and the space limitation for
any particular topic inherent in a comprehensive assessment
like the IPCC reports.
Going beyond broad conclusions regarding groups of
scenarios has required special efforts to undertake additional
comparison exercises, reminiscent of the technology sensitivity
analysis in SRES. For example, the chapter on mitigation
scenarios in the Working Group 3 volume of the IPCC Third
Assessment Report assessed several hundred scenarios in the
literature. Conclusions regarding this large set were limited
to descriptions of the range of scenario types, models used,
and the gases and mitigation strategies included. To identify
more specific lessons, assessment focused on a subset of 31
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scenarios that all achieved stabilization at 550 ppm CO2.
One important result was the range of costs of stabilization
across scenarios, which was found to be 0%–3.5% of GDP
(including a few scenarios with negative costs, or benefits
associated with stabilization). While indicative of the range
of uncertainty in costs, this result is limited to describing the
range of best estimates across models, but leaves out parameter
and other uncertainties within any given model, which could
substantially widen uncertainty ranges. In addition, it was
observed that costs and mitigation strategies were strongly
related to the assumed reference scenario, which varied widely
across studies, but specific conclusions about the relationship
could not be drawn because no systematic studies of this
question had been carried out. Such studies can be complicated
by the fact that it is not always possible to determine which
baseline has been used to develop stabilization and mitigation
scenarios.
Partly in order to address this gap in the literature,
a process was organized by SRES and TAR authors to
generate a set of ‘post-SRES mitigation scenarios’ that used
the SRES scenarios as baselines. It involved nine modeling
teams (including the six that participated in SRES) assessing
stabilization at (generally) two or more stabilization levels
between 450 and 750 ppm CO2, using two or more SRES
baselines. A total of 76 stabilization scenarios were produced.
This exercise produced some useful results (Morita et al 2000),
but again had to limit itself to broad conclusions. For example,
it noted that a key manner in which the baseline scenario
influences mitigation strategies was through the scale of
reductions required. Concentration stabilization requires much
larger reductions of CO2 emissions under development paths
with high emissions (such as the A1FI and A2 scenarios) than
under development paths resulting in lower emissions (such as
B1 and B2). These differences in reduction requirements result
not only in different costs of stabilization, but also in selection
of different technology and/or policy measures.
In addition, the comparison began to quantify the range
in other aspects of mitigation scenarios such as the timing of
reductions. It showed, for example, that scenarios stabilizing
at 450 ppm CO2 reached 20% reductions in CO2 emissions
within the next few decades, depending on the model and the
baseline scenario, as compared to reaching the same reduction
level between 2030 and 2090 for stabilization at 650 ppm or
above. It also concluded that taken together, results suggested
that stabilization at 450 ppm would require Annex I emissions
reductions that go beyond Kyoto commitments by 2020,
but that stabilization at 550 ppm would not. Furthermore,
early in the century emissions reductions tended to come
predominantly from reductions in energy intensity, while later
in the century they came predominantly from decarbonizing
energy supply.
These conclusions were important not because they were
qualitatively new, but because they quantified the general
features of a large set of results from a wide range of models
and scenarios applied to particular cases (the stabilization
levels). For example, the general tendency for reductions to
occur earlier for lower stabilization levels was well known, but
the assessment identified a specific timeframe. Similarly, the
comparison of reductions achieved in these scenarios to those
called for by the Kyoto Protocol was suggestive of the degree
of additional action that might be necessary.
These positive contributions notwithstanding, the force of
the conclusions was limited by the fact that the comparison
exercise was not directed specifically at these questions. For
example, while the range of times at which 20% reductions
in emissions were achieved could be identified for each
stabilization level, one could not conclude that this timing
was actually necessary, since alternatives in which timing
was varied were not tested. Similarly, the level of Annex I
emissions reductions made in the post-Kyoto period could be
reported, but one could not conclude that these were necessary,
or even optimal, since they were affected by differing
assumptions across models about how much emissions would
be reduced in non-Annex I countries. Thus, the post-SRES
exercise did contribute to learning from emissions scenarios,
but it fell short of what could be learned from a more focused
activity with greater financial resources and more time. Such
an activity would also offer an opportunity to develop a process
for assessing a range of different scenario approaches and
outcomes.
2.3. EMF-19 and -21 (2004, 2006)
The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) has carried out semi-
regular model comparison exercises for more than 25 years.
Each study typically consists of a set of scenarios that
participating modeling teams agree to produce (although not
all teams necessarily produce all scenarios). Results are
typically described in a collection consisting of individual
papers reporting results from each modeling team along with
a brief overview paper that examines results as a whole. This
overview is not designed to be an in-depth examination of the
collective results, but rather to highlight a few issues and key
results to give the reader a feel for the study as a whole.
For example, the EMF-21 study of multi-gas mitigation
involved 19 models running a number of scenarios aimed at
the broad issue of the role of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and
sinks in climate policy (de la Chesnaye and Weyant 2006). The
summary paper (Weyant et al 2006) points out main features
of the results, including the fact that all models show that
including non-CO2 gases in a stabilization scenario reduces
the need for true CO2 reductions and reduces the total cost
of mitigation. Although qualitatively this result was already
known, the model comparison gave a quantitative sense of how
much costs were reduced—15–70% reduction in carbon price
in 2025, and 0–56% in 2100, for stabilizing radiative forcing
at 4.5 W m−2 relative to a wide range of ‘modeler’s choice’
baseline scenarios. The overview also points out that models
using global warming potentials (GWPs), a physically-based
index used to equate the emissions of different gases, produce
more methane reductions early in the century compared to
models that avoid the use of GWPs by calculating radiative
forcing directly and producing a least-cost mix of emissions
reductions across gases.
The EMF-19 study included 14 models that focused on
‘Technology and Global Climate Change Policy’ (Weyant
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2004a). Its main goal was to better understand ‘how
models being used for global climate change policy analyses
represent current and potential future energy technologies,
and technological change.’ Models ran reference scenarios
(including a standardized SRES B1 scenario), a 550 CO2
stabilization scenario, and scenarios in which carbon taxes
reach 100 dollars per ton of carbon ($/tC). Although the
standardized B2 scenario provided a means of controlling for
the effects of the baseline scenario, the overview paper (Weyant
2004b) focused on the non-standardized reference scenarios
(modeler’s choice) and the 550 stabilization scenarios, and on
results at the global level. It emphasized the importance of
the reference scenario assumptions in determining the nature
of the stabilization scenario results, driving for example large
differences in the required carbon tax to reduce emissions,
which in turn influence technological choices, a finding which
echoed the TAR conclusions. It drew several other broad
conclusions as well: that stabilizing CO2 concentrations will
require major transformations of energy technologies, that this
transformation will take many decades, and that its costs,
while large, can be lessened by starting the process sooner and
pursuing many options in parallel.
Here again, results and broad conclusions from both
EMF exercises are certainly useful, and strengthened by the
fact that they are supported not by one model but by many.
Yet the potential for learning from such exercises clearly
exceeds these conclusions. Results could be used to identify
important dependencies, for example regarding the costs and
time required to develop and implement new technologies.
What drives variation in results across models? To what
extent are these variations driven by modeling issues (e.g.,
technologies included in some models but not others) versus
reflections of real world uncertainties (such as evolution of
costs over time)?
2.4. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007)
As in the TAR, Working Group 3 of the Fourth Assessment
Report included a chapter on mitigation scenarios (Fisher
et al 2007). The content of this chapter might be broadly
categorized as an assessment of ranges of inputs and outputs in
the scenario literature, quantification of some key results such
as costs, and identification of key sensitivities. For example,
this chapter concluded that the range of emissions and their
drivers, with a few exceptions, has not changed much since
SRES was published in 2000. It also pointed out trends in
the literature—toward more multi-gas scenarios, a small but
growing number that include global land use, and more that
incorporate endogenous technological change. As was the
case in the EMF exercises, qualitative conclusions on scenario
implications were not surprising—lower stabilization targets
imply earlier mitigation and higher costs, the importance of
technological development for costs, and the importance of
multi-gas mitigation for reducing costs and providing more
degrees of freedom in when and where to reduce GHG
emissions. The value added was the quantification of the
range of results available in the literature. In particular,
the assessment provided ranges of emissions trajectories for
different stabilization targets. For example, the chapter
concluded that the lowest stabilization scenarios (below
490 ppm CO2eq) have global emissions peaks before 2015,
while for the highest levels this turning point occurs around
2040. Regarding costs, it concluded for example that
stabilizing at 3.5–4 W m−2 will have costs ranging from a
benefit of 1% of GDP to a loss of 2% in 2050. The chapter also
identified what costs are sensitive to—the baseline scenario,
stabilization target, technologies assumed to be available, rate
of technological change, inclusion of multi-gas or land use
reduction options.
As was the case in the TAR, these descriptive findings
were useful in characterizing existing scenarios, but cannot
provide the same information as model comparison exercises
aimed at answering specific questions. Global emissions
tend to peak around 2015 to reach the lowest stabilization
scenarios, but must they do so? If they peak in 2025, is
stabilization no longer feasible? Or does this rather imply
substantially ‘negative’ emissions in the second half of the
century? Regarding costs, is the range of estimates in the
literature a full accounting for uncertainty, or a range of best
estimates that excludes the tails of the distribution, thus under-
estimating uncertainty?
2.5. US CCSP scenarios (2007)
The US Climate Change Science Program is in the midst of
producing 21 ‘Synthesis and Assessment Products’ (SAPs)
aimed at evaluating climate change science to help inform
policy and prioritize research. Product 2.1, released in 2007,
focuses on scenarios and is split into two parts: a first report
(2.1a; Clarke et al 2007) that develops and assesses a small set
of emissions and concentration scenarios, and a second (2.1b;
Parson et al 2007) that assesses the development and use of
global change scenarios more broadly. We focus on SAP 2.1a,
since it is a coordinated scenario development exercise and
assessment in the style of previous EMF and IPCC exercises
(see Parson 2008, for a discussion that draws on 2.1b).
The CCSP scenarios were developed by three modeling
groups, each of which produced a reference scenario (with
no climate policy) of its choice, and in addition four policy
scenarios in which concentrations were stabilized at a range of
levels in the long term. The stated aims of the exercise were
to address broad questions similar to those in previous EMF
exercises and IPCC assessments: what emissions paths are
consistent with various stabilization goals, and what might be
the costs and energy system characteristics required to achieve
them? There is a particular emphasis on implications for the
US, although global results are provided as well.
As in previous exercises, there is a detailed description
of the outcomes of the various scenarios across the three
models, which are interesting in and of themselves. For
example, outcomes regarding the relative growth of Annex I
and non-Annex I emissions under various conditions are
certainly germane to current policy debates, and descriptions of
energy system characteristics such as the percentage of energy
from zero-carbon energy sources over time provide important
insights into the possible scale of changes needed to achieve
5
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various long-term goals. Results also showed that emissions
reductions tend to occur first in the electric power system, and
later in the transport, industry, and buildings sectors, reflecting
the assumed relative costs of reductions across these sectors.
In addition, it was found that carbon prices varied substantially
across different models, an outcome that was attributed to
alternative assumptions about baseline scenarios and about
future technology availability and costs.
However, the scope for drawing conclusions based on
the CCSP scenario results as a set was relatively limited, as
in previous comparisons. The general conclusions reached
echoed those identified previously: that energy use and
emissions grow in the absence of policy; that in order to
stabilize concentrations, emissions must peak and then decline
(with timings similar to those found in the literature); that
stabilization will eventually require a transformation of the
energy system; and that the nature of the assumed baseline
scenario strongly affects outcomes. Stronger or more specific
conclusions were difficult to draw. The descriptive findings
are indicative of possible outcomes, but say little about the
robustness of the conclusions. If a given scenario indicates
a certain percentage of zero-carbon energy by 2050, for
example, it is not clear how to interpret the result. How much
different could that percentage be and still achieve the same
concentration outcomes, and at what cost?
As in earlier efforts, the intention seems to have been to
develop scenarios whose real value would be to serve as a
basis for later applications or as input to later assessments.
To this end the report prominently lists further analysis that
would be useful, including simulation of climate change
consequences and impacts following from these emissions
scenarios, more detailed analysis of the technological and
economic implications of mitigation, or assessment in the
context of other scenarios in the literature. It also indicates that
the key value added of these scenarios is the use of updated
economic and technological data, improved models, and a
multi-gas approach, particularly as compared to models used
in the SRES and TAR assessments.
3. Conclusions and recommendations
Based on the assessment of previous model comparison
exercises and scenario assessments, we find that coordinated
scenario development exercises often were not designed with
the explicit purpose in mind of learning from evaluation of the
outcomes as a set and have typically left most of the assessment
of their results to future efforts. However, those future efforts,
including most prominently the IPCC assessment reports, have
had insufficient capacity to carry out detailed and thorough
analyses, leaving much of the potential for learning from these
scenarios untapped.
One might be tempted to conclude that, given the limited
insight that has been derived from evaluating sets of scenarios
as a group, resources would be better invested elsewhere and
it would be advisable to reduce the number of such exercises
that are carried out. We do not believe this is the case. There
are many other benefits that flow from such activities, and the
lessons learned from evaluating results as a set are just one of
them. Thus the total return on investment is high. However it
could be higher, and a particularly valuable additional benefit
obtained, if assessment of results were improved.
In principle, assessments could be advanced either by
improving the assessment activities that are built-in to scenario
development processes, or by improving assessments that
take place after the fact. Here we make two specific
recommendations regarding the former, and one regarding the
latter. In either case, successful improvements will depend on
having a good understanding of the factors that have hindered
learning from scenario exercises so far. We have already
suggested that in many cases limited time and resources are
a contributing factor, but we offer additional possibilities here
as well.
(1) Future scenario development exercises should invest much
more time and effort in assessment of the set of results as a
whole, at the time they are produced
The SRES, IPCC assessment chapters, and EMF and
CCSP exercises have made important contributions to our
understanding of future emissions and mitigation options. In
addition, they have served as an impetus for generating a
large number of scenarios in the literature, stimulated model
development, and led to improvements in methodology within
the scenario community. Nonetheless, much greater gains
could be had from such activities by investing more time and
effort in the assessment of results across modeling groups at
the time the scenarios are generated. Specific authors could be
designated from the outset to carry out detailed comparisons
of scenario results in a manner designed to draw tangible
conclusions regarding the question being addressed.
There are likely many reasons such an approach has so far
been the exception rather than the rule, all of which represent
obstacles to improvement. Ultimately, understanding what
these obstacles are and how one might overcome them is an
important research question that could be investigated through
a range of social scientific approaches (Garb et al 2008). We
offer a few possibilities that might serve as starting points.
Most broadly, in many cases the goals of scenario generation
and comparison exercises are not well aligned with drawing
specific conclusions regarding a particular policy question.
Rather, the focus is often on improvements in technical
aspects of modeling, data and assumptions, something that
is exceedingly important but typically mostly of interest to
participating modeling groups only. Thus, it may be that little
effort is expended on thoroughly assessing the full set of model
results in order to draw conclusions because that is simply
not a goal of the exercise in the first place. If this is the
case, then improvements would require realigning the goals of
such exercises to more directly address specific questions (a
recommendation we make below).
The mix of incentives and disincentives for participating
groups may also serve as an obstacle to better assessment of
results. Modeling groups typically participate in comparison
exercises voluntarily, and participating involves a major
investment of time and resources. Thus to be viable these
exercises need to provide many carrots and few sticks. The
biggest carrots are the chance to publish results in a high
profile outlet, and the chance to stay at the forefront of research
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and model development by interacting closely with others in
the field. A thorough comparison and assessment of results
in the broader scenario contexts that go beyond technical
aspects of different models might be seen as a potential stick,
‘punishing’ a group whose model was not perceived to perform
as well as another. This obstacle might be overcome by
structuring the assessment component in such a way that it
minimized the potential for particular groups to be painted
in an unfavorable light. Or, the potential disincentive might
be offset by increasing the positive incentives, for example
by providing funding or an even higher profile for published
results.
Finally, cultural differences across disciplines may also
serve as a barrier to better assessment within scenario
exercises. It may that those individuals who would be best
equipped to carry out an assessment have different academic
backgrounds, peer groups, and views on modeling than do
the individuals participating in the production of the scenarios.
These differences could generate a potential for conflict if, for
example, the assessors are viewed as not being ‘of’ the same
community as the modelers and may not have the best interests
of participants in mind. Avoiding this type of conflict might
require careful choice of assessment teams, perhaps making
sure that they contained members of modeling teams as well
as those with broader purviews. Clear terms of reference
can also help avoid fears that the assessment would focus
on studying modeling teams and their scenario development
approaches rather than helping to improve the process of
scenario development and assessment.
(2) Scenario exercises should include a focus on more specific
questions and communities
In our review of assessments we found that most exercises
have been rather loosely focused on broad questions regarding
possible characteristics of reference and mitigation scenarios,
and less often focused on specific research or policy questions,
or on sensitivity of outcomes to specific assumptions, model
differences, or differences in scenario development processes.
Scenario exercises would lead to more informative conclusions
if they aimed from the outset to address more specific
questions. As we described above, previous exercises have
generated more informative conclusions when they focused
on more constrained questions. The sensitivity analysis to
technological assumptions within SRES, and the post-SRES
mitigation scenarios, both go some way toward this goal.
However, many more specific questions would make good
candidates for future coordinated, multi-model analyses.
• What are the implications of new information? Most
scenario analyses have been done within the context of a
single ‘story’ over time—SRES storylines, for example,
or scenarios in which the long-term stabilization goal is
known from the beginning. What are the implications
of learning—whether about climate risks or mitigation
technologies—that induces a sudden change in mitigation
strategy or long-term climate goals? How important is
flexibility in response strategies, and what are the limits
of responding to new information?
• What are the risks and opportunities of specific energy
resources such as biofuels, methane hydrates, or
bioengineered biomass?
• What conditions create ‘barely feasible’ scenarios? E.g.,
what is the lowest emissions or concentration outcome
that appears feasible, defined by pushing the envelope of
current knowledge? How does this lowest, barely feasible
outcome change if mitigation responses are delayed?
• What is the full range of uncertainty in emissions over
the next few decades? In particular, how rapidly
might emissions grow in the absence of policy? Most
global emissions scenarios have focused on 50–100
year timescales, with uncertainty assessments primarily
relevant to the longer term as well (e.g., Webster et al
2002, Gritsevskyi and Nakicenovic 2000, Nakicenovic
et al 2000). Shorter-term scenarios typically have not
included a careful assessment of uncertainty, despite
the fact that trends can change substantially over this
time period (Sheehan 2008) and can have important
consequences, including the possibility of making some
long-term climate change goals infeasible (O’Neill and
Oppenheimer 2002).
This recommendation complements those made in the US
CCSP scenario assessment report (Parson et al 2007; see also
Parson 2008). There, it was recommended that, because the
diversity of users and their needs is so large, many additional
scenario-related activities are needed to supplement ‘core’
global change scenarios that provide broad descriptions of
future emissions and climate change outcomes. Additional
activities would include interpretations of results at the regional
level, downscaling exercises, and development of additional
consistent scenarios at the national or sub-national level.
We agree with this recommendation. Our point here is
slightly different: that the core scenarios themselves should
be expanded in number to include more targeted, less all-
purpose scenarios. In other words, in addition to developing
the capacity to adapt existing types of core scenarios to specific
needs, we should also be producing different types of global
emissions and climate change scenarios that are better suited to
addressing specific questions and particular subsets of needs.
There may well be a trade-off between the specificity
of the question addressed, and the shelf-life of a scenario.
Today’s priority questions will change, particularly as the
climate debate turns increasingly toward response options. To
be most relevant, the scenario community will need to interact
more closely with user communities and develop scenarios,
and conclusions based on them, on a more flexible timescale.
It might seem that such an approach would be at odds with
the enterprise of constructing long-term global scenarios. But
because scenarios may extend 100 years into the future does
not mean that they have to be relevant for 100 years. Scenarios
can usefully inform our decisions today even if they are
overtaken by events tomorrow. In other words, we recommend
that a process be developed whereby the art and craft of
developing scenarios can evolve along with advances in our
basic understanding of the underlying processes. In this way,
scenarios would be continuously updated and from time to time
fundamentally overhauled depending on improvements in our
understanding, scenario development advances, and needs of
the salient ‘user’ communities.
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(3) Undertake more assessments outside of scenario develop-
ment or comparison exercises
The periodic IPCC assessments cannot be relied on to
provide all of the assessment of scenario results; the job is
simply too big. They are limited to already published peer-
reviewed studies and have restricted space for assessment. In
addition, such assessments often take too long so that the
emissions scenarios on which they are based are rendered
obsolete, or it is not feasible to truly integrate impacts,
vulnerabilities and adaption needs after the mitigation efforts
are accounted for in the emissions scenarios. Ideally, IPCC
assessments should be able to synthesize results not only from
individual modeling studies, but also from a greater number
of assessments of model comparison results than currently
exists. While in many cases it would be preferable to produce
these assessments in conjunction with the exercises producing
the scenarios themselves, in some cases this will not be
possible. The obstacles we discuss above (or others we have
not identified) may not be surmountable, time or resources
may prohibit such assessment, or assessment of the full set
of results may simply be a low priority. Thus it would
also be valuable to increase the number of assessments that
take place after the fact, separate from any given scenario
development exercise. For example, Parson et al (2007)
recommend that the US CCSP support an increase in the
capacity not only to develop but also to assess scenarios. In
general, establishing fora in which regular scenario comparison
(and possibly development) can be carried out would be
valuable and would improve understanding of which scenario
differences can be attributed to different assumptions, which
to different modeling approaches, and which to differences
in the underlying processes of scenario development and
formulation.
Such assessments after the fact are difficult to carry out.
It can be difficult or impossible to obtain the necessary model
input assumptions and outputs in comparable formats to carry
out detailed comparisons. It can also be difficult to interact
with members of the different modeling groups, who will have
moved on to other projects and priorities, in order to understand
model differences and interpret results of the comparisons.
At a minimum, to facilitate later assessment, better databases
of scenario results and comprehensive scenarios inventories
should be a high priority during scenario development and
comparison exercises. In addition, the makeup of author
teams carrying out such assessments should include sufficient
representation of modeling teams to facilitate the comparisons.
All three categories of recommendations we make here
are particularly relevant to a key aspect of the next phase of
emissions scenario development: analysis of ‘Representative
Concentration Pathways,’ or RCPs. The RCPs are four
pathways of atmospheric concentrations and emissions of
greenhouse gases, reactive gases, and aerosols that were
identified through an IPCC expert meeting in order to facilitate
a new parallel process of scenario development (Moss et al
2008). Climate modeling groups will use the RCPs as input
to generate new simulations of future climate changes, while
emissions scenario modelers are to develop a range of socio-
economic and technological scenarios that would be consistent
with the RCPs. Both sets of outcomes would then be used
in assessments of impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. The
RCPs clearly have a useful role to play, but past experience
suggests three important aspects of the scenario development
process that would lead to more useful outcomes. First, any
coordinated exercises organized as part of this process should
plan from the beginning to devote substantial time and effort
to the analysis of scenario results as a set, and not assume that
future IPCC (or other) assessments will have sufficient capacity
to do the job on its own.
Second, the development of emissions scenarios based
on RCPs should be done in a way that allows for more
useful comparisons to be made across models or methods
than has been done in the past. A large number of widely
differing models, scenarios, methods, and assumptions will
only lead to broad conclusions unlikely to be substantially
more informative than those drawn from past sets of multi-gas
scenarios. And third, emissions scenario development should
not focus overly much on RCPs at the expense of addressing
more specific questions. There are a wide range of important
questions that can be addressed through scenarios that are not
well served by casting them within the RCP framework (or,
in fact, that cannot be addressed within this framework at all).
If most of the emissions scenario community spends most of
its time on RCPs, an important opportunity for generating new
insights will be lost.
Finally, we recommend that the research community
improve its understanding of how scenarios are used. Our
analysis and recommendations have been focused on the
production of scenarios, and how best to learn from them. How
global emissions scenarios are used within the scientific field
is reasonably well known, for example in providing a common
framework for coordinating studies across climate change,
mitigation, and impacts and adaptation research communities.
However, we know woefully little about how they are used
outside of it. Improved awareness of scenario use will be an
essential component of choosing the most relevant questions
to address, and designing the best process to learn from the
scenarios that are produced.
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